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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
for crime, or to let. them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent
those who are manifestly unfit for continuing their kind." The court
points out that the principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is
broad enough to cover the cutting of the Fallopian tubes.7 And they
say that three generations of imbeciles are enough.
Thus we can draw the rule that a state law authorizing sterilization
of mental defectives under careful safeguards are valid under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and do not
deny due process and equal protection of the law.
There apparently is no such legislation in Wisconsin; at least, the
writer has not been able to find any relative statute or law within the
confines of the Wisconsin Statutes.
AL WATSON, '28
Fraud: Public Lands; Bona Fide Purchasers.
The late case of Independent Coal and Coke Company v. United
States,' was in the nature of an ancillary suit brought by the govern-
ment, in aid of a former, for the restoration to the government of
some 5,500 acres of public lands located in Utah, title to which was
procured by a fraud perpetrated upon the land officers of the United
States. The government had, in 1894, granted these lands to the State
of Utah to aid in the establishment of an agricultural college, certain
schools and asylums, and for other purposes.
The lands were later purchased from the state, upon application
and agreements, supported by affidavits that such lands were non-
mineral and did not contain deposits of coal. In January, 1907, the
United States brought the first suit against the purchasers of the lands,
and founded its action upon the charge that the procurement of the
lands was had by the employment of fraud and misrepresentation, as
the purchasers had, at the time of the certification, been fully cognizant
of the presence of coal deposits on the lands. The litigation resulted
in a judgment for the government. Milner v. United States2 and
United States v. Sweet.3
A decree was subsequently entered by the district court declaring
that the United States "is the owner" and "entitled to the possession"
of the lands in question, and perpetually enjoining the defendants from
setting up a claim to such premises. This declaration was firmly estab-
lished by a later affirmation by the Supreme Court.
The resultant holding of the second suit was to the effect that one
acquiring title to public land through the title of a state subsequent to
the certification by the United States to the state takes subject to the
equities of the United States existing at the time of the certifica-
tion. Furthermore, intervention by the state, as a party, was
deemed unnecessary, even though an agent of the government; uphold-
ing Williams v. United States,4 wherein this court said, "The state was
7 acobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. II; 25 S. Ct. 358; 49 L. Ed. 643; 3 Ann.
Cases 765.
'47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 714, 71 Law. Ed. 758.
1'43 C.C.A. 13, 228 Fed. 431, 439.
245 U.S. 563, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 193.
'138 U.S. 514, 34 Law. Ed. 1026, II Sup. Ct. Rep. 457.
NOTES AND COMMENT
not an intentional party to any wrong on the general government. It is
the dignified and proper course to be pursued by a state to leave to the
determination of the courts the question of right between the govern-
ment and the alleged wrongdoer, and conform its subsequent action to
that determination."
In consideration of this subject it is not out of place to observe that
recognized authorities have consistently maintained that a fraudulent
procurer of a conveyance may not defeat the defrauded grantor or pro-
tect himself from the consequences of his fraud by having the title con-
veyed to an innocent third person. Numerous authorities sustain the
foregoing principle, the leading of which are Moore v. Craweford,5 and
McDaniel v. Sprick.6
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has adjudicated that such fraud
will prevent a re-acquisition from a succeeding bona fide holder except
when such obviously fraudulent taint continues to or reattaches to the
transaction on the basis of equitable principles which obligate restitu-
tion. In Troy City Bank v. Wilcox,7 the foremost Wisconsin authority
on this principle, it is conclusively stated that a bona fide purchase of
an estate, for a valuable consideration, purges away the equity from the
estate, in the hands of all persons who may derive title under it, with
the exception of the original party, whose conscience stands bound by
the violation of his trust and meditated fraud. If such estate becomes
revested in him, the original equity will re-attach to it in his hands.
Likewise, a purchaser with notice of an outstanding equity, despite
a transfer to an innocent purchaser for value, may not on a later re-
purchase hold free of such equity. Of the many authorities adhering
to this doctrine, which is national in scope, the exceptionally well
reasoned case of Clark v. McNeal,8 is a valuable reference.
Thus, from the learned opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in Independent
Coal and Coke Company v. United States, supra, we can deduce with
great clarity, that the obligation of restitution, having its inception in
a fraudulent transaction, persists as to every interest afterwards ac-
quired by a tainted contract, or enjoyed as the fruit of such fraud.
The decree in this litigation was based firmly on recognized equitable
holdings, and the opinion subtly instills the doctrine that the court will
deal firmly and without equivocation with those who perpetrate fraud
upon the states and their public lands granted by the national govern-
ment.
CHESTER F. KRIZEK
Insurance: Automobile liability insurance; Direct liability of
Insurer.
In Ducommun v. Strong et al," the Supreme Court of Wisconsin an-
nounced a proposition which has given rise to much apprehension among
insurance companies doing business in this state. It will also affect the
130 U.S. 122, 128; 32 Law. Ed. 878, 880; 9 Sup Ct. Rep. 449.
0269 Mo. 424, 249 S.W. 6II.
7 24 Wis. 671.
a 114 N.Y. 287, II Am. St. Rep. 638, 21 N.E. 4o5.
214 N.W. 616.
